The Alchemy of Finance (Wiley Investment Classics)

"The Alchemy of Finance joins Reminiscences of a Stock Operator as a timeless instructional guide of the marketplace."
--Paul Tudor Jones
From the Foreword to the First Edition

"An extraordinary . . . inside look into the decision-making process of the most successful money manager of our time. Fantastic."
--The Wall Street Journal

"A breathtakingly brilliant book. Soros is one of the core of masters . . . who can actually begin to digest the astonishing complexity . . . of the game of finance in recent years."
--Esquire

"A seminal investment book . . . it should be read, underlined, and thought about page by page, concept by idea. . . . He's the best pure investor ever . . . probably the finest analyst of the world in our time."
--Barton M. Biggs
Director, BKF Capital Group, Inc.

Updated to include a new Preface and Introduction by Soros, and a Foreword by Paul A. Volcker

George Soros is unquestionably the most powerful and profitable investor in the world today. Dubbed by BusinessWeek as "The Man Who Moves Markets," Soros once made a billion dollars by betting that the British pound would be devalued. Soros is not merely a man of finance, but a thinker to reckon with as well. In The Alchemy of Finance, this extraordinary man reveals the investment strategies that have made him "a superstar among money managers"(The New York Times).

His philosophical tenet, Reflexivity, denotes a feedback loop: Individuals act on their views of a situation, thereby changing the situation. For example, if traders believe a stock is going up, they buy it, thereby bidding it up. But their belief caused the result; there may be no fundamental reason for the rise.
Thus what we think determines what we do and has consequences, but typically it is not correct.

Inspired by Heisenberg's rule about quantum particles, Soros proclaims a human uncertainty principle which suggests our understanding is often incoherent and always incomplete. From his case study, one notices that uncertainty continually besets Mr. Soros in managing his hedge fund, which has the same name as the particles subject to Heisenberg's uncertainty principle.

General models do not always translate into money making practice. But Soros provides an insight of great practical significance: traders need to be adaptive, because there is no way of knowing beforehand how a market situation will turn out.

The Quantum Fund experience demonstrates how that works. This exercise in global macro strategy, a master speculator's take on commodity, currency and equity markets, is a a litany of doubts and hazards.

He's been losing on currency trades for several years. Then in September 1985, he makes a killing by buying a lot of yen just before central banks switch to a new exchange rate system and the yen rises. There is a pattern: he sustains losses, reduces positions, gets out, then sees a great opportunity and pounces. In short, he constantly and quickly adapts to events.

Despite various setbacks, Quantum Fund's NAV per share rose 121% in 1985 and 43% in 1986. Such numbers make for legend and Mr. Soros became one.

How did he do it? He keeps an open mind and continually modifies his outlook with new information. As he remarks, "the markets provide a merciless reality check," and Mr. Soros never stays with an idea that fails the test. Most of the time he can't predict what's coming, but he promptly corrects course in response to feedback. That limits losses. On rare occasions he can see through the fog of uncertainty and hauls in the booty.

This is not an easy book to read, but as another hedge fund manager, Paul Tudor Jones, describes it in the foreword, it is a timeless guide.


Nothing like it   August 30, 2004
John Mooney (Oklahoma)
28 out of 34 found this review helpful

In all of investment literature, there's nothing quite like the peek inside Soros's mind in his "real-time experiment." The only thing that comes close is Lefevre's _Reminiscences of a Stock Operator_. Even when Soros is wrong (like when he sees the 1987 crash as marking Japan's rise to world dominance, or in predicting a worldwide credit collapse in the late 80's), he is fascinating. The guy really is smarter than sin, and the writing gives you a sense of the kind of relentless energy as well as intellect he brought to his work.

His discussion of "Reagan's Imperial Circle," in which Reagan's aggressive military posturing coaxed inflows of foreign investment into US dollar-denominated currencies, thereby masking the massive inflation his military spending created, explains as well as anything the US's prosperity in the 1980s. It also provides a road map, written twenty years ago, to what might happen now that those inflows, as well as the internally generated credit from Fed rate cuts have stopped. Inflation? Falling dollar? Is massive government spending really the Holy Grail politicians think today? Why did it not work for Johnson or Nixon, and work for Reagan? Will it work for Bush? Reading Soros greatly improves your understanding of the landscape that these questions come from.

I'm a dyed-in-the-wool value investor, and this is one of my three favorite investing books. Probably not for beginners, though.


hard to follow   August 12, 2008
Jeremy R. Whittaker (Mesa, AZ USA)
Honestly this book was hard to follow and I'm still not sure how Soros does it. He is an excellent thinker but I think this book was over the top for me.


The "hidden", unrealized by many sophisticated investors   December 30, 2009
A. Chaikul (Thailand)
The book focuses on how to utilize fund flows.

Very different from what Value Investors considers "value", different in a way that many Values rejected this idea, but to those who are interested in using the power of speculating to maximize your investment power, I recommend you to try this out.




Book Review from the Aleph Blog   January 23, 2010
David Merkel (Ellicott City, MD United States)
One trap you can fall into in life is to not learn from those that you disagree with, for one reason or another. George Soros would be an example of that. His politics are very different from mine, as well as his religious views. He's a far more aggressive investor than I am as well. I am to hit singles with high frequency over the intermediate term. He played themes to hit home runs.

The Alchemy of Finance made a big impression on me 15 years ago. Perhaps it was a book that was in the right place at the right time. It helped to crystallize a number of questions that I had about economics as it is commonly taught in the universities of the US.

First, a little about me and economics. I passed my Ph. D. oral exams, but did not receive a Ph. D., because my dissertation fell apart. Two of my three committee members left, and the one that was left didn't understand my dissertation. What was worse, I had moral qualms with my dissertation, because I knew it would not get approved.

My dissertation did not prove anything. All of my pointed to results that said, "We're sorry, but we don't know anything more as a result of your work here." I have commented before that the social sciences would be better off if we did publish results that said: don't look here -- nothing going on here. But no, and many grad students in a similar situation would falsify their data and publish. I couldn't do that. I also couldn't restart, because I had put off the wedding long enough, so for my wife's sake, I punted, and became an actuary.

That said, I was a skeptical graduate student, and not very happy with much of the common theories; I wondered whether cultural influences played a larger role in many of the matters that we studied. I thought that people satisficed rather than maximized, because maximization takes work, and work is a bad.

I saw how macroeconomics had a pretty poor track record in explaining the past, much less the present or future. In development economics, the countries that ignored the foreign experts tended to do the best. Even in finance, which I thought was a little more rigorous, I saw unprovable monstrosities like the CAPM and its cousins, concepts of risk that existed only to make risk uniform, so professors could publish, and option pricing models that relied on lognormal price movement.

Beyond that there was the sterility of economic models that never got contaminated by data. I was a practical guy; I did not want to spend my days defending ideas that didn't work in the real world. And, I felt from my studies of philosophy that economists were among the unexamined on methodology issues. They would just use techniques and turn the crank, not asking whether the metho, together with data collection issues made sense or not. The one place where I felt that was not true was in econometrics, when we dealt with data integrity and model identification issues.

Wait. This is supposed to be a book review. :( Um, after getting my Fellowship in the Society of Actuaries, I was still looking for unifying ideas to aid me in understanding economics and finance. I had already read a lot on value investing, but I needed something more.

On a vacation to visit my in-laws, I ended up reading The Alchemy of Finance. A number of things started to click with me, which got confirmed when I read Soros on Soros, and later, when I began to bump into the work of the Santa Fe Institute.

I was already familiar with nonlinear dynamics from a brief meeting with a visiting professor back in my grad student days, so when I ran into Soros' concept of reflexivity, I said "Of course." You had to give up the concept of rationality of financial actors in the classical sense, and replace them with actors that are limitedly rational, and are prone to fear and greed. Now, that's closer to the world that I live in!

Reflexivity, as I see it, is that many financial phenomena become temporarily self-reinforcing. We saw that in the housing bubble. So long as housing prices kept rising, speculators (and people who did not know that they were speculators) showed up to buy homes. That persisted until the effective cashflow yield of owning a home was less than the financing costs, even with the funky financing methods used.

Now we are in a temporarily self-reinforcing cycle down. Where will it end? When people with excess equity capital look at housing and say that they can tuck it away for a rainy day with little borrowing. The cash on cash yields will be compelling. We're not there yet.

Along with that, a whole cast of characters get greedy and then fearful, with the timing closely correlated. Regulators, appraisers, investment bankers, loan underwriters, etc., all were subject to the boom-bust cycle.

Expectations are the key here. We have to measure the expectations of all parties, and ask how that affects the system as a whole.

In The Alchemy of Finance, Soros goes through how reflexivity applied to the Lesser Developed Country lending, currency trading, equities, including the crash in 1987, and credit cycles generally. He gives a detailed description of how his theories worked in 1985-6. He also gives you some of his political theorizing, but that's just a small price to pay for the overall wisdom there.

Now, Soros on Soros is a series of edited interviews. The advantage is that the interviewers structure the questioning, and forces more clarity than in The Alchemy of Finance. The drawback (or benefit) is that the book is more basic, and ventures off into non-economic areas even more than The Alchemy of Finance. That said, he shows some prescience on derivatives (though it took a long time to get to the promised troubles), though he missed on the possibility of European disintegration.

On the whole, Soros on Soros is the simpler read, and it reveals more of the man; the Alchemy of Finance is a little harder, but focuses more on the rationality within boom/bust cycles, and how one can profit from them.